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The Meaning of Home: A chimerical concept or a legal 
challenge?

 
 
 
The concept of home appears to be in need of legal counsel.  Although the term is instantly 
familiar, and the physical reality is an important feature of our everyday lives, the legal 
concept of home has received surprisingly little attention.  As laypersons we know that there 
is „no place like home‟, that „home is where the heart is‟, and that „a man‟s home is his 
castle‟.  Yet the legal conception of home cannot be summed up so neatly.  This is largely 
due to the particular qualities of home: home is essentially a subjective phenomenon, it is not 
easily quantifiable, and consequently the value of a home to its occupiers is not readily 
susceptible to legal proof.  These factors present obvious impediments to the development of 
a coherent legal concept of home.  On a practical level, however, disputes over and involving 
home are a constant and significant feature of our legal environment.  If a legal concept of 
home could be developed, it could be utilised to inform the decision-making process where 
home is the scene or substance of legal disputes.  The imbalance between the prevalence and 
significance of home in practical terms, and the relative neglect of conceptual questions 
relating to home within legal circles is particularly striking in light of the fact that, despite the 
apparently „unscientific‟ nature of attachment to home, a substantial body of literature has 
emerged concerning the concept of home in the social science disciplines in recent decades.
1
   
 
This article shall discuss the meanings of home which have evolved from interdisciplinary 
research.  For the purposes of this discussion these values of home have been grouped into 
four broad categories: home as a physical structure, home as territory, home as a means of 
identity and self-identity for its occupiers, and home as a social and cultural phenomenon.  
Although this empirical and analytical research on the meaning of home to occupiers has 
taken an interdisciplinary approach, the findings of this body of research have not noticeably 
impacted on the legal domain, where little attention has been paid to the conceptual aspects of 
home.  The object of this article is to consider whether the concept of home which has been 
developed in other disciplines could be usefully employed in a socio-legal context, in order to 
inform the major legal issues surrounding home, and facilitate the process of developing a 
meaningful concept of home in law.  
 
The legal significance of „home‟ 
 
It is difficult to overstate the everyday importance of home in law.  The significance of land 
law as an „instrument of social engineering‟, and specifically of home as a legal entity is 
highlighted by the observation that:  
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 For example, Altman & Werner (ed), Home Environments (New York: Plenum Press, 1985); Benjamin (ed) 
The Home: Words, Interpretations, Meanings and Environments (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995).    
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All of us - even the truly homeless - live somewhere, and each therefore stands in some 
relation to land as owner-occupier, tenant, licensee or squatter.  In this way land law 
impinges upon a vast area of social orderings and expectations, and exerts a fundamental 
influence upon the lifestyles of ordinary people.
2
    
The centrality of home in human dealings, and the deep significance of rights and obligations 
relating to home, renders the lack of rigorous analysis directed towards the formulation of a 
legal concept of the value of home difficult to defend.  This section shall consider the 
influence of „home‟ on legal doctrine, and some of the contexts in which a clearly articulated 
concept of home could be usefully applied.   
 
Although it is argued in this article that the legal concept of home is underdeveloped, the 
proposition that „home‟ is significant as a special type of property, over and above its 
conception as the capital or investment asset of the house, is not totally absent from legal 
spheres.  The idea of home is relevant in a number of legal contexts, and the legislature and 
the judiciary have, at various times and in different contexts, acknowledged the significance 
of the fact that a house is occupied as a home.  The home in which occupiers are ordinarily 
resident is exempt from capital gains tax,
3
 and no income tax is payable for the benefit of 
occupying a house as a home.
4
  The family law issues concerning home range from issues of 
ownership and occupation of the matrimonial or family home,
5
 to the problems associated 
with home as the scene of domestic violence.  The effect on occupiers of loss of their homes 
is taken into account in the context of compulsory purchase, where „Home Loss‟ payments 
are made: “…to make some compensation to a man for the loss of his home, as opposed to 
the loss of any interest he might have in the particular dwelling which he formerly 
occupied.”6   
 
In the past, home sentiments have influenced developments in land law.  The strict settlement 
was a conveyancing device designed to keep land within the family, and so to protect the 
home for use and occupation by future generations.
7
  Another illustration of the influence of 
home in law is the Irish right of residence, whereby a landowner could confer on a member of 
the family, often a widow or single unmarried relative, the right to live in a property as a 
home for life, but with no interest in the property as a capital asset.
8
  Initiatives of this nature 
fell somewhat out of favour in England and Wales, however, in light of the policy of the 1925 
property legislation.  The 1925 legislation sought to promote the alienability of land by 
treating it like a mere piece of capital.  Land was valued: “…as an investment rather than as a 
home, to be bought and sold as market conditions demand, with the beneficiaries being 
interested in the proceeds of sale rather than the property for its own sake.”9  It is ironic that 
                                                 
2
 Gray & Symes, Real Property and Real People, (London: Butterworths, 1981) p4. 
3
 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, section 222. 
4
 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, Schedule A. 
5
 See Family Law Act 1996. 
6
 R v Corby District Council, ex p McLean [1975]1 WLR 735 at 736, per Lord Widgery CJ.    
7
 This ability to tie up land for generations was overridden by Parliament in the Settled Land Acts 1882-90, 
revised and consolidated in England and Wales in the Settled Land Act 1925.  This legislation ensured that 
property could be sold by a tenant for life, and the interests of subsequent owners could be overreached, 
converting their claim from an interest in the land itself, for example the home, to a subsequent interest in the 
capital sum obtained on sale. 
8
 See Wylie, Irish Land Law (Dublin: Butterworths, 3
rd
 ed, 1997), paras 20.13 et seq.  The conceptual basis of 
the right to residence has recently been reviewed in the Northern Ireland decision of Jones v Jones (2 February 
2001, Transcript: Lexis).  
9
 569 HL Deb (5
th
 Series) col 1722 (1 March 1996) per Lord Mackey.  Although the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 was intended to reintroduce the idea that: “…most co-ownership of property 
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whilst, on the one hand, the twentieth century witnessed a huge surge in owner occupation,
10
 
on the other hand, the property law regulating owner occupiers after 1925 was dominated by 
the rhetoric of land as investment, and the assimilation of land with other types of capital.     
 
It is noteworthy, however, that where policymakers have been specifically concerned to 
elevate the status of the home this can be achieved without major practical or theoretical 
difficulties, and without recourse to a „concept of home‟.11  The real problem from a 
conceptual point of view emerges when legal decision makers are required to balance the 
interests of occupiers in their homes against other, particularly commercial, interests.  The 
commercial interest in property as capital, or as an investment asset, comes into direct 
opposition with the interests, economic and non-economic, which occupiers may have in their 
homes in a number of instances.  These include, for example, the case where a landlord seeks 
to retake possession of property against the wishes of a residential tenant.  Another frequently 
occurring illustration of this clash of interests is the context of disputes between secured 
creditors and the occupiers of homes.  The rights of creditors come into conflict with the 
interests of occupiers when a non-debtor occupies property on which another, usually the 
legal title holder, has secured a debt.  If the debtor defaults on the loan, the creditor will 
usually seek to take possession and/or to sell the property in order to recoup the capital 
outlay.  Although a creditor has no direct right of action against the non-debtor occupier, the 
exercise of such remedies against the property itself has obvious implications on those in 
occupation.     
 
The avenues available to a non-debtor occupier who seeks to protect his or her interest in 
retaining use and occupation of a property as a home depend on the particular dimensions of 
his or her interest in that property.  Relevant factors may include whether the occupier has an 
ownership interest in the property,
12
 whether the occupier is a spouse,
13
 or has an „emotional 
and sexual relationship‟ with the debtor,14 whether the property is being used for purposes of 
matrimonial occupation,
15
 or as a home.
16
  Although a number of trends may be identified 
                                                                                                                                                        
is for the purpose of providing a home rather than for an investment.”; ibid, it remains to be seen whether this 
shift in emphasis will reverse the ideological tide of the trust for sale. 
10
 See further, below. 
11
 See for example, the decisions in Williams v Williams [1976]Ch 278 at 285; Re Evers Trust [1980]1 WLR 
1327; and Abbey National v Moss [1994]1 FLR 307; on the „collateral purpose doctrine‟ in the context of 
applications for the sale of co-owned property under section 30 of the Law of Property Act 1925.  The 
legislative policy of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 was also influenced by 
recognition of the special importance attached to the home by its occupiers: “…the intention of most spouses 
when purchasing the matrimonial home in joint names is not to hold it as an investment for sale, or as an 
investment asset pending sale, but to use it and keep it as a home.” 569 HL Deb (5th Series) col 1722 (1 March 
1996), per Lord Mishcon.  More recently, in Le Foe v Le Foe [2001]EWCA Civ 1870, the Court of Appeal has 
acknowledged the importance of the emotional security provided by home.  Ward LJ stated that he had 
sympathy for Mrs Le Foe, since: “[t]his has been her home and her mother‟s home.  There is huge emotional 
investment in it.”, ibid, para 10.  Ward LJ concluded, however, that Mrs Le Foe‟s emotional security was: “…an 
interest I cannot protect.”; ibid, para 13.     
12
 Where the occupier is a co-owner, the court‟s exercise of its discretion under section 30 of the Law of 
Property Act 1925 and its successor, section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 
will determine whether the creditor can order sale of the property; the doctrine of notice, or section 70(1)(g) of 
the Land Registration Act 1925 will determine priority between creditor and occupier; and the doctrine of undue 
influence will determine whether a surety or co-debtor occupier can avoid a transaction with a creditor.    
13
 Where the non-debtor occupier of the secured property is a spouse of the debtor, he or she may register a right 
of occupation as a charge against the creditor under section 31 of the Family Law Act 1996. 
14
 For example, in the context of undue influence. 
15
 This has been considered in the context of the Charging Orders Act 1979, see Harman v Glencross [1985]QB 
850.  
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from the outcome of disputes between creditors and occupiers, policymakers have not 
explicitly considered the overall balance struck between the claims of creditors on secured 
property, and the interests of non-debtor occupiers in their homes.
17
  Nevertheless, a balance 
has had to be struck, as disputes in these various contexts have arisen, between the interests 
of creditors and those of occupiers.  A common issue running through all categories of 
disputes between creditor and occupier is the need to balance the creditor‟s commercial 
interest in realising the capital asset represented by the house, and the occupier‟s interest in 
avoiding sale so as to retain the property for use and occupation as a home.  The outcome, 
however, almost invariably, is that the creditor‟s commercial interest in realising the capital 
value of the property prevails over the occupier‟s interest in remaining in the home.   
 
The arguments in support of creditors have been well rehearsed.  These have included the 
need to ensure that creditors continue to provide a readily available supply of credit finance 
to fund housing, particularly in this era of mass owner occupation; the potential impact which 
adverse conditions for creditors might have in respect of transaction costs for consumers;
18
 
and the argument that homesharing occupiers take their share of the good times, and must 
take their share of the bad.  The creditors‟ case is further enhanced by the fact that the 
creditors‟ interest in this transaction is relatively easy to ascertain.  Secured creditors acquire 
an economic claim on the relevant property, often the debtor‟s home.  The object of taking 
security is to ensure that, should the debtor default on repayment of the capital, creditors will 
be able to look to a range of remedies, such as possession and sale of the debtor‟s property, in 
order to ensure that their capital outlay is effectively recouped.
19
  Therefore, although 
creditors are unlikely to pursue these remedies so long as the debtor does not default on his or 
her obligations, the existence of adequate remedies for the enforcement of security is 
regarded as necessary in order to ensure that those who lend capital are willing to fund the 
acquisition of homes.  Any policy which places hurdles in the way of the creditors‟ ability to 
realise security may potentially have an adverse effect on the availability of credit finance, or 
                                                                                                                                                        
16
 Use and occupation of property as a family home is ostensibly protected in the context of bankruptcy 
proceedings, see sections 336 and 335A of the Insolvency Act 1986; Re Citro [1991]Ch 142 indicates a low 
point in the protection afforded to occupiers under these provisions, although the decisions in Judd v Brown 
[1998]2 FLR 360; Claughton v Charalamabous [1999]1 FLR 740; and Re Raval [1998]2 FLR 718 may indicate 
a slightly greater level of consideration for the fact that property is a family home in the context of bankruptcy, 
in circumstances of serious illness at least.  See also the „collateral purpose doctrine‟ which briefly appeared as a 
possible basis for protecting jointly owned property which was purchased for use and occupation as a home: see 
Stevens v Hutchinson [1953]Ch 299; and the argument accepted in Stott v Radcliffe (CA) 19 February 1982, 
that the court: “…should allow the trust to continue – and there should be no sale – so long as the purpose of the 
trust continues – that the house should be used as a home for the two of them.  But when the purpose of the trust 
comes to an end the house should be sold.”; Re Ever‟s Trust [1980]1 WLR 1327; Williams v Williams 
[1976]Ch 278 where the Court of Appeal stated that in the exercise of the section 30 LPA discretion the court: 
“…should regard the primary object as being to provide a home and not a sale.”; ibid at 285; but which 
ultimately proved ineffective in protecting the interests of occupiers in the home against creditors; see Re 
Soloman, A Bankrupt [1967]Ch 573; Re Citro [1991]Ch 142 on the emergence of the doctrine‟s limitations in 
disputes involving creditors.  See further, Fox, „Living in a Policy State‟ (2000) Liverpool Law Review pp59-
88.  
17
 See for example, Dewar, „Land, Law and the Family Home‟ in Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, (ed 
Bright and Dewar), where the development of policy in relation to the „family home‟ is described as: 
“…pragmatic and piecemeal, with apparently little cross-flow of concepts or policies between different legal 
conceptual categories.”; p328.     
18
 “No one has great sympathy for lenders or bank…the point is that at the end of the day it is the borrower  who 
pays, unless there is some speedy and efficient method of conveyancing.”; 437 HL Deb (5 th Series) col 650 (15 
December 1982) Lord Templeman. 
19
 In this respect, the proprietary remedies may operate as an inducement on the debtor to pay, as a sanction 
against non-payment, or as a remedy of last resort through possession and sale. 
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impact upon the costs of credit for consumers.  Consequently, since the viability of the 
substantial proportion of housing stock in owner occupation depends upon the availability of 
credit, the financial concerns of creditors are an important factor to be weighted in any 
formulation of government policy in this area.   
 
On the other hand, however, we have the interests of occupiers.  The occupier‟s interest in 
retaining property for use and occupation as a home is complex, raising both financial and 
non-financial issues.  As those who have attempted to ascertain the meaning of home through 
empirical and theoretical research have acknowledged, the occupier‟s interest in home is:  
…a relative concept, not an absolute one that can be defined in a dictionary or by a 
linguist.  Given that it transcends quantitative, measurable dimensions and includes 
qualitative subjective ones, it is a complex, ambiguous concept that generates confusion.
20
   
It is often difficult to verbalise ideas about home, since they are highly personal, and not 
easily analysed.
21
  In addition, the idea of a personal attachment to home can be portrayed as 
sentimental and emotive, and therefore trivialised, particularly when measured against the 
objective and quantifiable claims of creditors to the capital value of the property.  These 
inherent difficulties could be regarded as providing an argument against attempting to 
develop a coherent legal concept of home, particularly for those who regard the occupier‟s 
interest as inconvenient, since establishing a valid basis for attaching weight to the interests 
of occupiers in their homes could potentially operate to subjugate the claims of creditors, 
whose economic clout weighs heavily on the balancing scales.   
 
Although the significance of home is often acknowledged in this context, case law indicates 
that at the crucial stage of balancing the occupier‟s claim against that of a creditor, the courts 
do not attach sufficient weight to the occupier‟s claim to home to outweigh the commercial 
interest.
22
  The absence of a legal conception by which the interests of occupiers are valued, 
particularly their non-economic interests in retaining a home for the purposes of continued 
use and occupation as a home on the basis that they have an attachment to the particular 
property, creates practical and analytical difficulties.  From a practical perspective, it is 
difficult to make a persuasive argument in favour of the occupier.  When balancing the 
interests of creditors in the capital represented by a property against an occupier‟s claim to 
retain the land for use and occupation as a home, however, policymakers have had little 
guidance regarding the weight to attach to interests in home.  Nourse LJ has acknowledged 
that:  
The balancing which one is required to do between the interests of the creditors and the 
interests of the wives and families - who are of course entirely innocent parties - is by no 
means an easy thing to do. The two interests are not in any sense commensurable. On the 
one hand, one has the financial interests of the Crown, some banking institutions and a few 
traders. On the other, one has the personal and human interests of these two families. It is 
                                                 
20
 Lawrence, „Deciphering Home: An Integrative Historical Perspective‟, in Benjamin (ed), op cit, p58.  
21
 Hayward, „Home as an Environmental and Psychological Concept‟ (1975) Landscape 20, 2-9.  Dovey also 
described the difficulties associated with the concept of home: “…home is not an empirical variable whose 
meaning we might define in advance of careful measurement and explanation.  As a consequence, understanding 
in this area is plagued by a lack of verifiability that many will find frustrating.”; „Home and Homelessness‟, in 
Altman & Werner (eds), op cit, p34. 
22
 See, for example, the landmark decisions in Re Citro [1991]Ch 142; Barclay‟s Bank v Hendricks [1996]1 
FLR 258; Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1990]1 All ER 1085; City of London Building Society v 
Flegg [1986]Ch 605, [1988]AC 54; Bristol & West Building Society v Henning [1985]1 WLR 778; Paddington 
Building Society v Mendelsohn (1985)50 P&CR 244.  
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very hard to see how they can be weighed against each other, except in a way which 
involves some value judgment on the part of the tribunal.
23
   
It might be added that this difficult balancing exercise is frustrated further by the analytical 
difficulties created by the absence of solid conceptual grounds on which to attach weight to 
the interests of occupiers.  The value of home is not easily portrayed in tangible terms.  
Nevertheless, the fact that home is not an easy subject for legal analysis does not justify 
ignoring the values which it represents.  Furthermore, as one author has indicated in an 
analogous context,
24
 the phenomenon of home is: “…too prevalent and too significant to be 
deemed inappropriate and then forgotten.”25   
 
It is important to emphasise that this argument in support of the concept of home is not 
intended to devalue the claims of creditors, nor to suggest that the interests of occupiers ought 
necessarily to prevail in conflicts with creditors.  It is, however, argued that the value 
judgement which must inevitably influence this balancing exercise has been made without 
any clearly articulated conception of the occupier‟s interest in the home.  In what has recently 
been described as a climate of „unsustainable home ownership‟,26 the issues raised by 
conflicts between creditors and occupiers will continue to require the attention of the courts, 
and of legislative policymakers.
27
  This article shall therefore seek to identify some of the 
values of home which might inform a legal concept of home, and so be „weighed in the 
balance‟ on the occupier‟s side when decisions involving conflicts between home interests 
and commercial interests are considered. 
 
The search for a concept of home 
 
There is nothing especially new about the search for a concept of home.  A substantial 
amount of work has been carried out in this area in recent decades
28
 in a number of 
disciplines, including social and environmental psychology, phenomenology, sociology and  
built environment studies.  Cultural, socio-economic and socio-political theorists have 
grappled with the concept of home, as have anthropologists, architectural and planning 
researchers, etymologists and geographers.  Numerous studies have investigated the affective 
value of home, that is, the emotional attachment that occupiers feel towards their homes, and 
a significant body of theory has developed from these studies.  Generations of social 
scientists have laid the foundations for discourse on home, and these are now being built 
                                                 
23
 Re Citro [1991]Ch 142 at 150, quoting from Hoffman J in the High Court.  
24
 When examining the extent of agreement amongst scholars concerning the terminology of home. 
25
 Benjamin, „Afterword‟ in Benjamin (ed), op cit, p294. 
26
 Ford et al, Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A social analysis of mortgage arrears and possessions, (The 
Policy Press, 2001). 
27
 Although there has been some retreat from the recession high point of mortgage possessions, it has been 
suggested in a recent analysis of mortgage arrears and possessions that: “…the contingent set of circumstances 
which generated the housing crisis of the early 1990s masked a set of more enduring socio-economic 
transformations which have raised the „normal‟ level of risk associated with home ownership compared to that 
which pertained in earlier periods.”; ibid, p44.  
28
 “It is not surprising that research and interest in this area are burgeoning.  First, people in every society 
usually have some type of residence.  Although their form and permanence vary widely from one group to 
another, homes are more or less a universal.  Second, in many societies, homes are one of the most important 
places.  Homes offer physical amenities that sustain and support the residents, and they are often essential to the 
very survival of their occupants.  Furthermore, homes are important centres for the development and 
manifestation of certain psychological meanings.  Individuals develop identities and regulate privacy in homes; 
families establish, grow, bond themselves to a unit in homes and often bond themselves to the larger society 
through their homes.  Thus homes are the repository of central and essential psychological and cultural 
processes.”; Altman & Werner, „Introduction‟ in Altman & Werner (eds), op cit, p xix.  
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upon, as analysis of the meanings of home becomes increasingly sophisticated.  For example, 
Jeanne Moore recently described: “…a renewed enthusiasm for examining home, which is 
drawing from decades of psychological and sociological exploration.”29  Nevertheless, 
neither this enthusiasm, nor the product of this interdisciplinary discourse, appear to have 
been fed into the legal system,
30
 nor have they influenced policy making at the critical level 
of disputes between the rights of secured creditors, and the interests of occupiers in remaining 
in their homes.  Indeed, the legal concept of home remains at the „pre-scientific‟, 
„speculative‟ stage, which the social psychologists broke through in the mid-1970s.  Research 
which has been carried out across a wide range of disciplines now stands to be built upon by 
socio-legal scholars, to construct a legal concept of home. 
 
The etymology of the term „home‟31 provides an interesting starting point for consideration of 
the significance of home as an affective environment.  It has been suggested that there is no 
word quite as emotionally loaded as „home‟ in the Romance languages.32  The emotional 
bond which has traditionally been acknowledged between occupiers and their homes is 
highlighted in Brink‟s historical work on the etymology of the expression „home‟.33  Brink 
offers some examples of the types of feelings signified by linguistic references to home.  He 
states that the Old Irish expression for home is associated with the meaning „love‟, while the 
Old English, Greek and German terms make reference to marriage and to sexual intercourse, 
with meanings such as „to take home‟, „to bring to bed‟.34  Brink concludes that: “…the 
words – now and in ancient times – that are direct cognates with, or that relate to home, deal 
with dwelling and affection, perhaps the affection for one‟s dwelling place, one‟s home.”35  
This supports Brink‟s argument that historically, home did not simply refer to a concrete 
structure, but to an abstraction; that the term „home‟ was not viewed as referring to the 
property itself, or at least, was: “…not limited to the exclusively physical habitation itself, but 
include[d] concepts of dwelling and affection.”36   
 
The danger of describing home as associated with affection or love, is that this style of 
argument is unlikely to resonate with lawyers.
37
  The problem, however, is that there is a 
degree of sentimentality behind ideas about home.  On the one hand, the popular usage of the 
term „home‟ has been criticised as: “…vague and fuzzy (and „warm‟ in feeling)…”38  
Rapoport qualifies this comment, however, with the suggestion that the very nature of this 
response should be analysed, since: “…there is an implicit folk theory behind it that needs to 
                                                 
29
 Moore, „Placing Home in Context‟ (2000) Journal of Environmental Psychology 207-217, 207. 
30
 Altman & Werner describe cross-disciplinary contact as one of the challenges facing those interested in 
homes; „Introduction‟, Altman and Werner (eds), op cit, xx. 
31
 A term which is not in itself uncontroversial, see chapters by Brink, Rapoport and Lawrence, in Benjamin 
(ed), op cit. 
32
 Hollander, „It all depends‟ in Mack, Home: A Place in the World (New York: New York University Press, 
1993). 
33
 Brink, „Home: The Term and the Concept from a Linguistic and Settlement-Historical Viewpoint‟, in 
Benjamin (ed), op cit.   
34
 Ibid, pp19-20.  See further, below, on the associations between family and home.   
35
 Brink, op cit, p20. 
36
 Benjamin, „Afterword‟ in Benjamin (ed), op cit, p295. 
37
 Although it was suggested in the Parliamentary debates preceding the enactment of section 336 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 that: “...we were moving into an area where perhaps the heart should rule more than the 
head…” 459 HL Deb (5th Series) col 1266-7 (7 February 1985), Lord Lucas; judicial attitudes towards this 
provision were epitomised by the decision in Re Citro, op cit, where Nourse LJ held that the interests of 
creditors ought to prevail over those of occupiers in the family home, because “one must be just before one is 
generous.”; Re Bailey [1977]1 WLR 278 at 284, per Walton J.     
38
 Rapoport, „A Critical Look at the Concept „Home‟‟, in Benjamin (ed), op cit, p29.   
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be made explicit and examined.”39  This challenge has permeated the study of home, as 
scholars have worked towards a more precise definition of the factors underlying feelings 
evoked by home environments.  The motivation of much of this research has been the 
hypothesis that, while ideas about home may be based on romanticised, mythologised, 
idealised memories, that does not diminish the way in which these associations inform the 
psychology of home.
40
  If an argument is to be made in support of home, however, these 
factors must be crystallised into a more concrete, tangible format.  It has been suggested that 
one way of conceptualising home would be to consider the equation home = house + x;
41
 that 
is, by separating the idea of home into, on the one hand, the physical structure of the house 
(clearly an important element in the equation since it provides physical shelter and the locus 
for the experience of home) and on the other, the „x factor‟.   
 
The physical structure of the house presents no conceptual difficulties to lawyers, since it is a 
concrete, tangible entity.  The conceptual challenge in relation to home is to unravel the 
enigmatic „x factor‟.42  In short, the x factor represents the social, psychological and cultural 
values which a physical structure acquires through use as a home.  Whilst these values are 
inherently subjective, and may not be held by all occupiers, a number of qualities have 
repeatedly and consistently emerged from empirical research into occupiers‟ responses to 
home.
43
  These feelings about home can be grouped into four main clusters of value-types: 
home as a physical structure offers material shelter; home as a territory offers security and 
control, a locus in space, permanence and continuity and privacy; home as a centre for self-
identity offers a reflection of one‟s ideas and values, and acts as an indicator of personal 
status; and home as a social and cultural unit acts as the locus for relationships with family 
and friends, and as a centre of activities.
44
  These headings are relatively loose categories, 
which although separated here in the interests of clarity do not form separate categories of 
meaning.
45
  Indeed, it can justifiably be argued that home is a fluid concept, which may 
embrace some or all of these meanings to a particular occupier.      
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Hayward (1975) op cit.    
41
 Rapoport, in Benjamin (ed), op cit, p29.  Hollander has claimed that the: “…common – and, unlike many 
common expressions, vulgar – use of „home‟ as a euphemism of „house‟ is by and large the linguistic waste 
product of the American real estate industry.”; Hollander, op cit, p 37. 
42
 Merritt reached a similar conclusion in relation to the „use-value‟ of real property, a quality which he 
described as the „housing services‟ of a dwelling: “I have searched for these services with patience and 
diligence, and regretfully conclude that they do not exist and therefore that all conventional analysis is based on 
an entity that is purely phantasmal.  In the long pursuit of this chimera, the hunter always circles back to his 
starting point and finds no more, yet no less than a dwelling, located in space, within and beyond which 
individual human beings grouped in households engage in a complex set of activities.”; Owner-Occupation in 
Britain, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1992), p65. 
43
 In „The Meaning of Home: Literature Review and Directions for future research and theoretical development‟ 
(1991) Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 96-115, Despres bases her categories of meaning on six 
important behavioural studies: Baker, Kramer and Gilbert, „The Pier 1 Imports Study of the American Home‟ 
(Study No 871025), (New York: Louis Harris and Associates, 1987); Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 
„The Meaning of things: Domestic Symbols and the Self‟ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); 
Hayward, „Psychological concepts of home‟ (1977) Challenge 10-13; Rakoff, „Ideology in Everyday Life: The 
Meaning of the House‟ (1977) 7 Politics and Society 85-104; Sebba & Churchman, „The Uniqueness of Home‟ 
(1986)3 Architecture and Behaviour 7-24; Sixsmith, „The Meaning of Home: An exploratory study of 
environmental experience‟ (1986)6 Journal of Environmental Psychology 281-298.  Since Despres‟ article, 
further empirical studies have included Smith, „The essential qualities of a home‟ (1994) Journal of 
Environmental Psychology 31-46; Wikstrom, „The Home and Housing Modernisation‟, in Benjamin, op cit.   
44
 There are also significant socio-cultural connotations connected with the idea of home as a place to own.   
45
 Somerville has argued for greater integration of the phenomenological and social psychology approaches, so 
that each individual meaning of home, such as privacy, or identity, can be internally explicated as a 
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Home as a physical structure 
 
Whilst much of the academic interest in the concept of home has focused on the „x factor‟, it 
is important to highlight the significance of the more tangible aspects of home.  The house is 
the element of home which provides crucial physical shelter for its occupiers.  In this respect: 
“…[h]omes offer physical amenities that sustain and support the residents, and they are often 
essential to the very survival of their occupants.”46  It is the loss of this physical shelter, 
„houselessness‟, which is often referred to as homelessness.   
 
The clear connection between creditor/occupier disputes and homelessness is revealed by 
national survey data which indicates that a significant number of households accepted as 
„homeless‟ by local authorities in England give mortgage default or rent arrears as the main 
reason for the loss of their last home.
47
  Whilst these statistics chart the most extreme 
outcome,
48
 it is important to bear in mind that loss of home can be a traumatic experience - 
even when it does not lead to houselessness.
49
  Research has indicated that shelter is not the 
only significant attribute of home as a physical structure.  Although the physical structure is 
the most tangible feature of home, home cannot be defined simply as a structure providing 
shelter. Empirical research
50
 has suggested that: “[h]ome as a physical entity embraces not 
only the physical structure and style of architecture, but also the human space available.”51  
The physicality of the house enables the other attributes of home to be experienced by 
occupants.  The physical structure of the house provides the locus for family life, a place of 
safety,
52
 a place of privacy, continuity and a sense of permanence.
53
   
 
Prior to the surge of interest in home amongst environmental psychologists in the 1970s,
54
 
scholarly literature often identified home with the physical structure of the house or 
residence.
55
  The attractions of this approach, particularly to a rationally underpinned legal 
system, are obvious: 
The rational attitude is biased towards the tangible.  Yet the phenomenon of home…is an 
intangible relationship between people and the places in which they dwell; it is not visible 
nor accurately measurable.  Reason responds to intangibility by reducing terms such as 
                                                                                                                                                        
physical/psychological/social construct, „The Social Construction of Home‟ (1997) Journal of Architectural and 
Planning Research 226.   
46
 Altman & Werner (eds), op cit, p xix. 
47
 In 1998-99, of 105,470 households accepted as homeless by local authorities, approximately 7%, that is, over 
7,000 households cited mortgage default or rent arrears as the principal reason for their loss of home; Social 
Trends 30 (2000), Chart 10.15, p173.  In 1994, 10% of people who became homeless in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland gave court orders consequent on mortgage default or rent arrears as the main reason for their 
homelessness; Social Trends 27 (1997), p178.       
48
 The experience of repossession leading to homelessness is clearly a „worst case scenario‟ for occupiers 
following a dispute with a creditor.   
49
 More on loss of home, below. 
50
 Sixsmith, op cit. 
51
 Ibid, p292.  Sixsmith adds that: “…warmth, telephones, everyday modern conveniences are important.  One 
participant realised the significance of environmental services only after he had lived in a house which was 
extremely basic with regard to them.”  
52
 The idea of home as a place of safety is not, however, uncontroversial, but is open to challenge from gender 
theorists, who highlight the dangers which can exist in the home environment.  This is considered further, 
below. 
53
 Somerville, „The Social Construction of Home‟ (1997)14 Journal of Architectural and Planning Research 
226-245.  
54
 Moore op cit, pp 209-10. 
55
 Benjamin, „Afterword‟, in Benjamin (ed), op cit. 
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home to precise and bounded definitions.  Rationally considered, a home becomes reduced 
to a house – the meaning and experience of home as a relationship becomes confused with 
the object through which it is currently manifest.
56
   
Dovey does not argue that the rational approach is wrong, merely that it does not carry a 
monopoly on truth or progress.
57
  It is significant, however, that psychological research has 
never shown the common assumption to be true - that the physical structure of a property is 
its most important aspect.
58
  The non-physical and less tangible values of home have been 
established by numerous studies.
59
  The results of this research have gone some way towards 
elucidating the „x factor‟ of home.  The following sections explore some of these additional 
values of home. 
 
Home as territory 
 
The concept of home as a physical structure is closely associated with the territoriality of 
home.
60
  The territory of home as a type of setting satisfies a number of social and 
psychological needs: home is the sole area of control for the individual; home is the most 
appropriate physical framework for family and family life; home is a place of self-expression; 
and home provides a feeling of security.
61
  Home provides the spatial framework of the 
occupier‟s life, and through its familiarity can foster a sense of belonging,62 „rootedness‟63 
and continuity.
64
  The occupier‟s response to these features of home has been articulated as 
instinctual - that: “[a]s with other members of the biosphere, too, humans display marked 
patterns of territoriality.”65  
 
The territory of home has also been described as psychologically significant because it 
provides a „locus in space‟ for its occupiers – a place to come back to.66  Dovey has made a 
connection between this aspect of home territory – „acquiring a fixed point‟ – and the 
occupier‟s sense of identity:67 “…to be at home means to know where you are; it means to 
inhabit a secure centre and to be oriented in space.”68  It has been suggested that colloquial 
idioms about home reflect a real and experienced response to the territorial characteristics of 
home.  Following an empirical study on the „essential qualities of home‟ in the early 1990s, 
Smith concluded that: “[s]uch common expressions as „a man‟s home is his castle‟ are 
supported by…research findings, which suggest that this feeling of control within the home is 
                                                 
56
 Dovey, „Home and Homelessness‟, in Altman & Werner (eds), op cit, p52.  
57
 Ibid, p53. 
58
 Hayward, „Home as an Environmental and Psychological Concept‟ (1975)20 Landscape 2-9. 
59
 See note 43 and associated text.  
60
 This feature is heavily emphasised by Sebba & Churchman (1986) who argue that: “…the uniqueness of the 
home lies in its psychological and social meaning and in the opportunity it affords the occupants to exert control 
over the space and the behaviour within it.”; p21.     
61
 Rapoport, op cit, p30; see also Sebba and Churchman, 1986. 
62
 Sixsmith (1986) op cit; Smith „The essential qualities of a home‟ (1994) Journal of Environmental Psychology 
31 at 32. 
63
 Described as: “…the physical experience of feeling anchored to a place…”; Smith, op cit, p 32.    
64
 “…having a place to return to, where one feels a sense of belonging, also engenders feelings of continuity, 
stability and permanence.”; Smith, op cit, p32.  
65
 Buttimer, „Home, Reach, and The Sense of Place‟, in Buttimer and Seaman (eds), The Human Experience of 
Space and Place, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p167. 
66
 Hayward (1975) describes this „geographic orientation‟ as changing the world from homogenised space to 
differentiated space. 
67
 See further, below. 
68
 Dovey, „Home and Homelessness‟, in Altman and Werner (eds), op cit, p36. 
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salient for most people and is linked to the satisfaction of basic psychological needs.”69  
Smith further highlights the beneficial psychological outcomes for the occupier who can 
establish security and control within the territory of home.
70
  This direct correlation between 
the territoriality of home, and the psychological health of occupiers has also been asserted by 
Porteous, who adds that the territorial satisfactions provided by home: identity, security and 
stimulation; are not only beneficial, but necessary for psychological health.
71
  
 
It is important to note, however, that not all home occupiers experience these positive 
elements of identity, security, and stimulation.  When home becomes a place of danger, the 
positive associations of home: as a place of safety, of security, of control over oneself and 
one‟s environment; become subverted, and the effect can be psychologically very damaging.  
This aspect of home has been emphasised by feminist theorists, who have highlighted the 
darker side of home as a common site of domestic violence and fear within families.
72
  The 
negative aspects of home - as: “a prison and a place of terror as well as a haven or place of 
love…”;73 - indicate that: “[t]he concept of home as a sanctuary or place of secure retreat 
does not necessarily hold true for those in weaker positions in the domestic power 
relationships…”74  This perspective, along with the argument that the benefits of home are 
acquired at woman‟s expense,75 has often led feminist critics to reject the values of home.76  
Another ambivalent feature associated with the idea of home as a „haven‟ is the implicit 
suggestion that the outside world is a place to be feared.  Saegert claims that: “[a]t deeper and 
less consciously accessible levels, being anchored in home may always be an ambivalent 
feeling.  When the home is considered a haven, it implies the world requires being hidden 
from.”77  This line of reasoning also reinforces the feminist public/private analysis which 
rejects the positive characteristics of home because it is regarded as a private sphere, and thus 
as a place of confinement for women.
78
   
 
                                                 
69
 Smith, op cit, p32. 
70
 “When individuals control space and have privacy needs met, feelings of comfort and freedom are possible.  
This freedom implies being able to relax and do as one wishes…”; ibid. 
71
 „Home: the territorial core‟ (1976)66 Geographical Review 383-390. This proposition is supported by 
research findings concerning the psychological effects of loss of home, which are discussed below. 
72
 The issues raised by this discourse have been extensively discussed elsewhere, see for example, Stanko, „Fear 
of Crime and the Myth of the Safe Home: A feminist critique of Criminology‟ in Yello & Bograd (eds) Feminist 
Perspectives on Wife Abuse (London: Sage, 1988) pp75-88; Sarage, „Dangerous Places: The Family as a site of 
crime‟ in Munchie & McLaughlin (eds) The Problem of Crime (London: Sage, 1996), pp184-227; Moran, „The 
poetics of safety: lesbians, gay men and home‟, in Crawford (ed.) Crime, Insecurity, Safety in the New 
Governance, (Cullompton: Wilans Publishing, 2001).  
73
 Moore, op cit, p212.   
74
 Ibid. 
75
 That is, that: “[w]omen serve, nurture, and maintain so that the bodies and souls of men and children gain 
confidence and expansive subjectivity to make their mark on the world.  This homely role deprives women of 
support for their own identity and projects.”; Young, „House and Home: Feminist Variations on a Theme‟ in 
Olkowski (ed), Resistance, Flight, Creation: Feminist Enactments of French Philosophy (Cornell University 
Press, 2000), p49.   
76
 The negative values of home from a feminist perspective have been extensively explored, see for example, 
Martin & Mohanty, „Feminist Politics: What‟s Home Got to do with it?‟ in de Laurentis (ed) Feminist 
Studies/Critical Studies, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp191-211; de Laurentis, „Eccentric 
Subjects: Feminist Theory and Historical Consciousness‟ (1990)16(1) Feminist Studies 115-150; Honig, 
„Difference, Dilemmas, and the Politics of Home‟ (1994)61(3) Social Research 563-597.  
77
 „The role of housing in the experience of dwelling‟, in Altman and Werner (eds), op cit, p290. 
78
 “The public-private dichotomy is not a mere statement of difference: the difference matters because the public 
is economically and politically more important than the private.”; Green and Lim, „Weaving Along the Borders: 
Public and Private, Women and Banks‟, from Scott-Hunt and Lim (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Equity and 
Trusts (2001, London: Cavendish), p91.  
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Some recent feminist analysis has suggested, however, that „home‟ should not be rejected 
wholesale, and that: “[d]espite the real dangers of romanticising home, there are also dangers 
in turning our backs on home”.79  Young suggests that:  
“If house and home mean the confinement of women for the sake of nourishing male 
projects, then feminists have good reason to reject home as a value.  But it is difficult 
even for feminists to exorcise a positive valence to the idea of home.  We often look 
forward to going home and invite others to make themselves at home.  House and 
home are deeply ambivalent values.”80 
The ambivalence in the relationship between women and their homes has been described as: 
“…a mixture of affection, reciprocated towards the home as a nurturing environment, and 
resentment towards the demands of the home.”81  Far from detracting from the argument of 
this paper, however, this ambivalence towards home adds weight to the case in support of the 
development of a more explicitly reasoned legal concept of home.  Moore has suggested that: 
“More focus is needed on the spiritual, cultural and symbolic essence of home which 
writers in phenomenology have highlighted.  However, the renewed focus on meaning 
will need to focus on ways in which home disappoints, aggravates, neglects, confines 
and contradicts as much as it inspires and comforts us.  The challenge for future 
research is to empirically engage with this multifaceted concept without losing sight 
of the many layers of home.”82 
Any legal concept of home should therefore be capable of reflecting the range of experiences 
which take place in homes, and the complexity of the responses which emanate from 
experiences of living and dwelling and being „at home‟.  Unfortunately there is not space in 
this article to deal with the very significant question of gender and home in any detail.  For 
the purposes of this article, however, it is sufficient to say that a great deal of research has 
been done, and continues to be done, on the variety of experiences represented by home, and 
on the meanings of home from alternative perspectives.  This research material exists as a 
useful tool to assist when considering the construction of a concept of home which reflects 
the full range of human experiences in home.  
 
The significance of „home as territory‟, and particularly the desire for the experience of 
security in the home, is heightened by the association between home and family.  Evidence 
from a number of empirical studies has indicated that: “…a critically important function of 
the home is the sense of security that it is supposed to offer…”;83 and that the popular 
perception of home as a „place of security and protection‟ is heightened when the family 
home is occupied by children.
84
  The additional currency of the family home has been 
recognised to a certain extent in the context of creditor/occupier disputes.  Parliament has 
passed a number of measures which ostensibly protect the family home.
85
  Although these 
provisions have not generally translated into actual protection against creditors in the event of 
default,
86
 they indicate the legislative tendency to focus on family as a trigger for protection 
                                                 
79
 Young, op cit, p75. 
80
 Ibid, p49.   
81
 Darke, „Women and the Meaning of Home‟, in Gilroy & Woods (eds), Housing Women (Routledge, 1994), 
p11. 
82
 Moore, op cit, p213. 
83
 Fitchen, op cit, p316.  
84
 Ibid.    
85
 Principally the Family Law Act 1996, which was preceded by the Matrimonial Homes Acts 1967 and 1983; 
and section 336 of the Insolvency Act 1986, which makes special provision for the family home in the event of 
bankruptcy.   
86
 The provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 come into play against a creditor only when the non-debtor 
spouse has registered „matrimonial home rights‟ as a charge prior to the credit transaction.  A creditor is unlikely 
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of home.  In a similar vein, judicial policy has also taken account of the fact that a property is 
a matrimonial home in the context of charging orders.
87
  Although the outcome generally 
remains the same - creditors almost invariably prevail, and ultimately an order for sale is 
often granted - where any policy initiative has been directed at the interests of occupiers in 
the home, it has tended to reinforce the understanding of home as „protected territory‟ on the 
grounds of its use and occupation by the family.   
 
Another significant factor in relation to home as territory is the degree of privacy conferred 
by home.  Research has repeatedly established the importance of the home territory as a site 
of privacy and autonomy for occupiers.
88
  Porteous describes home as a: “...haven for 
everyone in a public world where we are valued less for ourselves than for the roles we play.  
In essence, the possession of a home confers certain valuable rights of privacy and autonomy 
on the occupant.”89  What‟s more, there is potential for development of the privacy aspect in 
the context of a legal concept of home.  The right to respect for home under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights
90
 is embedded in the overall context of the Article, 
which states that: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence.”  Since the rights protected under Article 8 are generally considered 
conjunctively, there is also, again, a clear connection between home life and family life.  
Article 8 is essentially concerned with privacy,
91
 so consequently the references to family 
life, home, and correspondence are viewed in the context of their role in the private sphere.  
 
Various attempts to date to invoke the Article 8 protection in the context of disputes between 
creditors and home occupiers have been unsuccessful.
92
  Though the Court of Appeal 
appeared to acknowledge the potential relevance of Article 8 in this context in Albany Home 
Loans v Massey,
93
 post-incorporation attempts to invoke the Article 8 reference to home 
                                                                                                                                                        
to come into conflict with such a charge because a simple search reveals the registration of the rights, and a 
creditor will then either request that the charge is removed, or that the non-debtor spouse is joined in the 
transaction.  In circumstances of bankruptcy, the impotence of section 336 was illustrated by judicial attitudes, 
for example in Re Citro, see notes 16, 37.   
87
 See Harman v Glencross [1986]2 WLR 637 at 648. 
88
 See Fichte, op cit, p318. 
89
 Porteous, op cit, p386.  
90
 Article 8 is included in Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 as one of the „Convention Rights‟ to be 
given effect in UK domestic law.  The right to respect for: “…private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”; in Article 8(1) is qualified by Article 8(2), which provides that: “There shall be no 
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and 
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”    
91
 “As a collective noun designating the rights involved in Article 8, the „right to privacy‟ is often used 
nowadays.”, van Dijk & van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 3
rd
 Ed, 1998), p489.   
92
 See Karia v Franses, ChD, 12 November 2001, where the applicant‟s contention that the proposed sale of his 
home by the trustee in bankruptcy would breach his rights under Article 8 were described as „greatly 
exaggerated‟.  In Birmingham Midshires Mortgage Services Ltd v Sabherwal (CA) 17 December 1999, the 
Court of Appeal considered the impact of Article 8 in a case concerning priority between the interests of a 
secured creditor and the occupier of a home.  Although the Article 8 claim was rejected on the basis that the 
Human Rights Act 1998 was not yet in force, Walker LJ added that: “I do not see that it gives Mr Beaumont any 
assistance in this case…BMMS is not a public authority.  The judges order was made in accordance with law 
and it was necessary for the protection of BMMSs rights as a secured lender.” 
93
 [1997]2 All ER 609.  The decision in Massey involved a married couple, joint mortgagors of the family home.  
Following default on the mortgage, the mortgagee applied for a possession order, however, Mrs Massey raised a 
successful defence of undue influence.  The Court of Appeal was therefore required to consider whether the 
creditor‟s request for possession ought to be granted notwithstanding her continuing interest in the home.  
 14 
against a creditor have not yet been fruitful.
94
  In Ebert v Venvil,
95
 Mrs Ebert sought to 
appeal orders granted to permit the sale of her home by her husband‟s trustee in bankruptcy.  
Although Aldous LJ acknowledged that: “It is always traumatic to be evicted from the family 
house…and one cannot but have very great sympathy for her”; the applicability of Article 8 
was dismissed with the statement that: 
Mr Ebert has been adjudicated bankrupt.  The case has been finally settled.  He owned half 
the house.  The only way his creditors could get recompense was by the house being sold.  
In those circumstances the European Convention has no application at all.  The European 
Convention is not a charter which allows bankrupts to avoid paying the money which the 
courts have held to be owing to creditors…It is a Convention protecting people from 
encroachment into their basic rights.  It is not a document which allows people to avoid 
paying their debts.
96
  
It is arguable that if an Article 8 argument were to be successfully raised in favour of the 
occupants of home, the resolution of the dispute between the parties could potentially turn on 
the issue of proportionality between the creditor‟s lawful action to realise security, and the 
occupier‟s interest in the home.  A balancing task of this sort, however, would surely require 
a more clearly articulated conception of the values that a property holds for the occupier as a 
home than legal analysis currently offers.  The potential for development along these lines 
adds weight to the call in this article for a more fully worked-out legal concept of home. 
 
Although many of the attributes of home as territory
97
 can arguably be achieved in other 
types of territory, home has been regarded as particularly significant because it provides: 
“…a special setting in which one makes commitments to those relationships.”98  The „special‟ 
aspect of home as a territory is thus derived not only from the values represented: family, 
privacy, security, control; but also from the sense of belonging, rootedness and continuity 
which home is thought to foster.  This conception of home as a place of security and a locus 
for personal orientation is also associated with another cluster of values relating to home: 
home as identity.  
 
Home as identity 
 
The values of „home as identity‟ are principally associated with the symbolic significance of 
home for its occupiers.  There are two main constituent elements to home as identity: on the 
one hand, the psycho-analytical perspective addresses the importance of home in an 
occupier‟s self-identity: that is, „home as a symbol of one‟s self‟.  The intimacy of the 
connection between home and self-identity is reflected in the claim that: “[a]fter the body 
itself, the home is seen as the most powerful extension of the psyche.”99  The most extreme 
illustration of this perspective is perhaps Carl Jung‟s claims that he dreamt of himself as a 
house.
100
  On a more typical level, however, it has been suggested that the experience of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Schiemann LJ referred to Article 8 of the ECHR, and stated that: “This, as it seems to me, whilst not enacted as 
part of our domestic law, provides a clue to the solution to the problems posed by this case.”; op cit, at 612.  
94
 Although Richman „Using the Human Rights Act to save the family home‟ (2001)150 New Law Journal 1102 
raised arguments based on Article 8, these were speculative only, and she does not present any authority to 
indicate that the courts will be sympathetic to her proposed reasoning.    
95
 19 December 2000, CA; Transcript: Lexis. 
96
 Ibid, paras 16-18. 
97
 As a place of privacy, as a location for the development of relationships with others, or as a locus in space. 
98
 Hayward, „Psychological concepts of home‟ (1977) Challenge 10-13, 12. 
99
 Despres (1991) op cit, p100. 
100
 Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections, (London: Collins, 1969), p253.  See further, Cooper, „The House 
as Symbol‟, (1974) Design and Environment 30-37.    
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home as an „identity shell‟ is widely experienced by occupiers.101  Beyond the physical and 
territorial needs that are satisfied by the experience of home, homes: “…provide autonomy 
and a space to develop an identity, and they are „cultivators‟ and symbols of the self.”102   
 
The means by which home becomes an identity shell is also regarded as a function of the 
occupier‟s presence, and of their self-identity.  Home has been described as: “…a world in 
which a person can create a material environment that embodies what he or she considers 
significant.  In this sense the home becomes the most powerful sign of the self of the 
inhabitant who dwells within.”103  This analysis regards home as both a product of the 
occupier‟s self-identity, and the place in which the occupier has the freedom to express that 
identity.  Another perspective on the role of home as an element of the occupier‟s identity 
addresses the way in which an identity in the home enables its occupiers to project their own 
self-identities into the future, since: “[k]nowing that we have the power to remain in a place 
and change it permits us to act upon and build our dreams.”104  This aspect of the concept of 
home has obvious implications in relation to security of tenure and repossessions by creditors.  
The involuntary loss of home
105
 at the hands of a creditor could potentially undermine an 
occupier‟s self-identity, even to the extent that since: “…people‟s sense of both personal and 
cultural identity is intimately bound up with place identity, loss of home or „losing one‟s 
place‟ may often trigger an identity crisis.”106  
 
The second central element of „home as identity‟ is based on the socio-psychological theory 
that home is an integral element of the occupier‟s social identity.  The prevalence of this 
tendency to identify home with one‟s social identity is highlighted by the reality that:  
In the most basic sense, a person needs to have a home, an address, a place with which to 
be identified officially and legally, in order to transact most personal business, to vote, or 
to claim various benefits.  Not having a residence carries a stigma, whether one is 
described in the newspaper‟s police blotter as having „no known address‟ or as being 
among „the homeless‟.  Moreover, the particular home one occupies is both a source and a 
tangible expression of the identity of its occupants, as environmental psychologists have 
found.
107
    
The social identity theory in relation to home, in particular the use of home to signify status, 
(and to avoid stigma) is closely associated with the issues surrounding home ownership, 
which are considered further below.
108
  There are also significant points of contact between 
the family dimension and the social identity of home.  Whilst home has been demonstrated to 
represent a significant symbol of the self- and social-identity of occupiers per se, it has been 
suggested that, in addition: “[h]ome is a projection and basis of identity, not only of an 
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 See Dittmar, The Social Psychology of Material Possessions (1992, Harvester Wheatsheaf), p113.  
102
 Ibid, p113.  See also Pallasmaa, „Identity, Intimacy, and Domicile – Notes on the Phenomenology of Home‟, 
in Benjamin (ed), which claims that, as a consequence of this process of self-identity through home, home 
becomes: “…a collection and concretization of personal images of protection and intimacy, which help one 
recognise and remember who one is.”; p135. 
103
 Csikszentmihalyi and Rochbery-Halton, „Home as Symbolic Environment‟, in The Meaning of Things – 
Domestic Symbols and the self (Cambridge University Press, 1981), p123.  
104
 Dovey, „Home and Homelessness‟, in Altman and Werner, op cit, p43.  
105
 See further, below. 
106
 Buttimer, „Home, Reach, and The Sense of Place‟, in Buttimer and Seaman (eds), The Human Experience of 
Space and Place, London: Croom Helm, 1980), p167. 
107
 Fitchen, p317. 
108
 See also Ford et al (2001) pp 148-9 on the stigma of mortgage repossession and the movement from home 
owner to council tenant. 
 16 
individual but also of the family.”109  It has been noted above that whilst the concept of home 
has not noticeably engaged the attention of policy makers, the additional currency added to 
home by the presence of family appears to lend greater weight.
110
  It is arguable, however, 
that the associations which have emerged between family and home, in relation to the values 
of home from occupiers‟ perspectives, may indeed vindicate the legislative and judicial 
policies which favour family homes.  These policies, which evolved without explicit 
consideration of the broader context of home, may, however, have been informed by the 
implicit emphasis on family within socio-cultural ideas about home.  
 
Home as a social and cultural unit  
 
Some of the most recent research on home has focused on the concept of home as a social 
and cultural unit.
111
  In a recent article, Moore observes that while: “…there is a renewed 
enthusiasm for examining home, which is drawing from decades of psychological and 
sociological exploration”;112 a salient factor of the current phase of analysis concerning home 
has been: “…the need to draw together the personal and the cultural.”113  In its broadest and 
most traditional sense, home, in a social and cultural context, referred to „the homeland‟.114  
In fact, the close cultural association between home, family, and place of domicile is 
relatively recent.
115
  It was not until the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries that home came to be 
associated with: “…the personal and domestic, with „family life‟.”116  Research into modern 
social and cultural meanings of home has indicated, however, that it is the association with 
family that gives the contemporary home cultural centrality.
117
  Fitchen‟s research into 
responses to home has indicated that: “[e]ven when children are not explicitly the focus, the 
family unit is apparent.”118  Another study119 reflected the popularly held view that: “…it is 
the presence of children and the activity of family life that makes a house into a home.”120  
 
Empirical research on home also indicates that other values of home, for example the 
perception of the home environment as providing protection and representing security, are 
also influenced by cultural factors.  Sebba and Churchman
121
 found that security was the 
most frequently mentioned quality of the home environment by young children.
122
  The 
image of home as a place of refuge is prevalent in many societies, and this is arguably 
bolstered by cultural representations of home.  One example, drawn from a US context, is 
provided by Fichten: 
An image of home as a refuge from the dangers of the outside world has deep historical 
roots in this society, perhaps captured in the mythical pioneer image of the rough cabin on 
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the prairie, in which the husband-father is pictured protecting his family and its new home 
from the dangers of wilderness life.  Though the nature of the perceived dangers has 
changed over time, the home is still thought of as the haven, where people, especially 
children, are safe.
123
  
The practical, emotional and psychological impact of loss of this „haven‟, for example 
through repossession and sale by a creditor, is heightened by the socio-cultural connection 
between occupier and home.  The environment that the occupiers are at risk of losing is the: 
“…culturally cherished institution of home.”124 
  
Loss of home 
 
The previous sections have identified some of the values that could be taken into account in 
the development of a concept of home.  Such a legal concept of home could, if developed, 
have wide ranging application.  The context of disputes between creditors and occupiers, 
however, provides a stark example of the way in which the values of home to an occupier are 
actually minimised, especially when weighed against the more tangible claims of creditors.  
This occurs despite the fact that the net result for the occupier, if the creditor‟s claim to the 
house as security prevails, is often the loss of their home.  Empirical studies which have 
focused on the psychological impact of losing one‟s home125 identify extreme responses 
including alienation and grief amongst the dispossessed.
126
  In „Grieving for a Lost Home‟, 
Marc Fried considers the crisis of uncontrollably losing one‟s home,127 and concludes that: 
“…for the majority it seems quite precise to speak of their reactions as expressions of 
grief.”128  Victims of home loss reported a range of responses, including:  
…feelings of painful loss, the continued longing, the general depressive tone, frequent 
symptoms of psychological or social or somatic distress, the active work required in 
adapting to the altered situation, the sense of helplessness, the occasional expressions of 
both direct and displaced anger, and tendencies to idealise the lost place.
129
 
The motivation for Fried‟s investigation was: “…the realisation that relocation was a crisis 
with potential danger to mental health…”130  Fried concludes that the additional values of 
home to an occupier, as a physical structure, as territory, as identity and as a social and 
cultural unit – the „x factor‟ – caused some occupiers to experience a grief response on the 
loss of home.
131
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This analysis is consistent with the findings of Ford et al,
132
 who conducted a qualitative 
study of the experiences and perceptions of 30 families with children who had experienced 
mortgage repossession.  The experience of mortgage repossession leading to loss of home 
caused feelings of sadness, loss, insecurity, and in some cases, damage to health.  Ford et al 
also argue that the experience of loss of home through mortgage repossessions has a 
detrimental effect on the occupier‟s psycho-social well-being and in turn on their health, 
since: 
…losing a home through mortgage possession involves more than just losing a property.  
Of course the material aspects of losing a mortgaged home are very important…buying a 
property constitutes a capital investment and an important financial asset; something to 
ensure financial security in old age and something to „pass on‟ to the children.  But losing 
a home in this way means more than that to most people.  The possession of a property 
constitutes a significant loss of a home that is invested with meaning and memories.  Not 
only that but…the bureaucratic procedures associated with the administrative processes of 
possession mean that people have to ensure long periods of insecurity and uncertainty.  A 
whole set of events is set in train that is out of their control…according to the psychosocial 
literature on the social determinants of health it is these experiences (uncertainty and lack 
of control) that are coming to be regarded as among the most crucial determinants of poor 
health in contemporary societies.
133
 
Ford et al thus conclude that mortgage arrears and possessions impact on the repossessed 
occupier‟s „emotional capital‟, and further, that the impact of loss of home on an occupier‟s 
emotional and consequently on his physical health
134
 justifies their claim that unsustainable 
home ownership is a public health issue.  
 
Another study by Porteous which examines the destruction of communities is also analogous 
with loss of home through repossession, and supports the argument that the repossessed 
occupier experiences a sense of loss that cannot be redressed by simply relocating that 
occupier, or family, in another housing environment.  Porteous claims that: “…this domicide 
has negative social and psychological effects on its human victims.”135  This research 
established that, in the context of forced relocation of home: “[c]hange almost invariably 
involves loss, and bereavement-like symptoms of grief are common among those uprooted 
and relocated.”136  It is particularly interesting to note that Porteous relates this grief to the 
loss of a particular home, since: “…[r]elocatees often improve their living standard 
dramatically, but pay for this in terms of considerable social and psychological disruption.”137  
It is arguable that this type of evidence should be weighed in the balance when policymakers 
are considering the argument that occupiers can be compensated for loss of home by 
preserving a portion of the equity in the property for them to „start again‟.138   
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This research evidence, however, is afflicted by the same difficulties which affect arguments 
in support of the concept of home: “…the problem lies with the fact that we are dealing with 
environmental intangibles – attachment, grief, loss – which are immeasurable, difficult to 
articulate, and thus easy to ignore by the cost-benefit brigade.”139  Furthermore, the search for 
a concept of home is hampered by the fact that: “[b]eing intangible, qualities of home are 
often only identified when they are lost.”140  Buttimer claims, however, that:  
[w]hether all these values are consciously articulated in legal or behavioural terms does 
not seem to be the crucial point.  In fact, they are often not brought to consciousness until 
they are threatened: normally they are part of the fabric of everyday life and its taken for 
granted routines.
141
   
It is suggested, however, that the socio-economic changes which have highlighted disputes 
between creditors and occupiers, and which have led to the current phenomenon of 
unsustainable home ownership,
142
 now require a more explicit articulation of the respective 
interests of creditors and occupiers in domestic property, in order to enable their respective 
claims to the house as security and house as home to be justifiably balanced.     
 
The Ideology of Home Ownership and the Concept of Home 
 
The ideology of home ownership has compounded the meaning and values associated with 
home.  Indeed, the political and economic policies which have promoted the ideology of 
home ownership in the UK and beyond
143
 have influenced the socio-cultural relationship 
between „home‟ and „home ownership‟.  Some commentators have argued that home 
embodies greater significance when the property in question is owned by its occupiers, and 
that the values of home ought therefore to carry greater weight in the context of owner 
occupation.  Fitchen, for example, suggests that: “…the cultural meanings of home are 
compounded by the additional cultural meanings of home ownership.”;144 culturally, if not in 
reality, home ownership is perceived as conferring greater freedom and independence, and as 
giving the home owner a greater degree of control.  Furthermore, the status conferred by 
home ownership may be relevant in the context of an occupier‟s self-identity.145   
 
In an interesting study, Rakoff
146
 indicates a focus by occupiers on the economic ideology of 
home, amongst middle income occupiers at least, many of whom regarded their houses as: 
“…a commodity or an investment opportunity, something to be bought and sold with an eye 
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to profit as well as use...”147  It is noteworthy, however, that even whilst valuing their homes 
as investment assets: “…this view was clearly of secondary importance in the larger 
meaning-system of the house.  A series of more elusive meanings carried greater weight for 
these people.”148  These „more elusive meanings‟ included family associations, identity issues 
such as personal status and success, a place of permanence and security and a refuge from the 
outside world.  Rakoff claims that: “[t]he house, particularly the owner-occupied house, 
seemed to be a powerful symbol of order, continuity, physical safety, and a sense of place or 
physical belonging.”149  Of particular significance, however, is the observation that: 
…people continually returned to the premise that ownership was necessary for actualising 
any or all of [these meanings].  Even the renters agreed that ownership made real and 
possible the control, the security, the status, the family life that all of these people were 
seeking in and through their houses.  This centrality of ownership was usually expressed in 
terms of freedom.
150
 
The proposition that home ownership enhances the occupier‟s experience of home is 
supported by studies carried out by Smith, who emphasises home ownership as conferring a 
sense of continuity,
151
 and Saunders, who claims that data on tenure and meanings of home 
indicates that home ownership provides greater ontological security for occupiers.
152
  Thus, 
as these studies demonstrate, home ownership actually enhances many of the „x factor‟ 
qualities which essentially distinguish a house from a home.   
 
This proposition has been challenged, however, by research evidence that where people tend 
to chose rental homes, rather than becoming owner occupiers,
153
 they do not generally feel 
any less „at home‟ in their properties.154  It is suggested, instead, that data which indicates 
that home owners derive greater satisfaction as occupiers in their homes is biased by the: 
“…ideological framework underpinning these policies and trends which explicitly ties the 
tenure status of housing to the meaning of home.”155  Marcuse supports this theory, based on 
his analysis of the American position.
156
  In an excellent piece of deconstruction on 
homeownership versus renting, he argues that the characteristics associated with home, such 
as control, status, and privacy, are not inherently enhanced by home ownership.  Marcuse 
also raises a further argument that the factors which are cited in support of the proposition 
that home ownership provides a more meaningful home experience: security of tenure, 
control, and so on; could be, if governments chose to do so as a matter of policy, built into the 
law in relation to the homes of tenants, thus ensuring that these characteristics of home could 
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be experienced in the same way by renters.  The overriding argument is that owner 
occupation, as a form of tenure, does not inherently make for a better home. 
 
The additional home benefits which, it has been argued, accrue to owner occupiers: freedom, 
continuity, security; are clearly associated with the security of tenure which is assumed to 
accompany home ownership.
157
  In considering the extent to which home ownership 
enhances the experience of home, it is important to bear in mind: “…the fact that one‟s 
abilities to maintain an identity between house and home – that is, to actually dwell in the 
place one regards as home – are strongly related to the socio-political economy of the country 
in question.”158  The „security‟ which allegedly results from owner occupation must be 
considered in the context of the: “…increasing proportion of owner-occupiers in Britain, 
North America, and other industrialised countries who are unable to meet their mortgage 
payments and eventually become depossessed.”159  The suggestion that home ownership 
offers greater „ontological security‟ to occupiers has also been challenged.160  In Gurney‟s 
paper on the meaning of home he argues that: 
Alongside the growth in home ownership…has come an increase in disrepair, mortgage 
arrears and repossessions, and homelessness.  The financial benefits of this tenure are a 
double-edged sword.  As more and more „marginal borrowers‟ have taken on mortgages to 
pass property on to their children, or as financial investments, the negative effects of home 
ownership have become apparent.  One thing is certain.  Households facing mortgage 
arrears, or essential repairs they can not afford seem unlikely to derive the feelings of 
niche and belonging from home described by Saunders.
161
  
Gurney, writing in 1990 at a high point of mortgage repossessions, considered the meaning of 
home for those owner occupiers who faced the prospect of losing their homes at the hands of 
creditors, and concluded that: “[e]ven if a home of one‟s own does foster feelings of 
ontological security, the continual worry and struggle to avoid being „behind with the 
mortgage‟ seems likely to deaden the effect of such a psychological boost.”162  Moreover, 
recent analysis of contemporary patterns of home ownership
163
 indicates that these issues will 
be of on-going relevance when conceptualising home.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Obviously home is a difficult concept to pin down.  It presents challenges of definition and 
measurement, and, as an ultimately experiential phenomenon,
164
 is difficult to prove.  The 
meaning of home to occupiers may encompass a wide range and variety of responses.
165
  
Drawing on an extensive body of research in the social sciences, this article has shown that 
home represents a complex and multi-dimensional amalgam of financial, practical, social 
psychological, cultural, politico-economic and emotional interests to its occupiers.  Within 
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the legal system, however, and particularly when weighed against the concrete financial 
claims of creditors, these values have not been recognised by policymakers, nor translated 
into a coherent legal concept which could inform the task of balancing the interests of 
creditors against the claims of occupiers to the continued use of property as their home.   
 
Although it is often argued that creditors must prevail on economic policy grounds, the 
importance of home, and the impact of losing one‟s home on occupiers, demands a more 
explicit analysis of the other side of the equation.  There is no ambiguity surrounding the 
value of the property to the creditor.  Surely, however, if this value is to be „balanced‟ against 
the value of the home to the occupier, some effort should be made, from a conceptual point of 
view, to develop a clearer concept of the value of home in law.  The chimera of home that 
currently lurks in the shadows of policy reasoning is easily ignored, or trivialised.  A more 
coherent concept of home should, at the very least, ensure that legislative and judicial policy 
decisions which undermine the interests of occupiers in their homes are more explicitly 
reasoned. 
 
Questions remain as to how a concept of home should be constructed.  That task is somewhat 
beyond the remit of this paper, and would require considerable careful thought.  One aspect 
which will undoubtedly demand attention, and provoke controversy, is the relationship 
between home and family.  It is interesting to note the prevalence of family in studies 
extrapolating the values of home amongst occupiers.  Family emerges as a significant 
indicator in each of the main types of value considered above.  The desire for security within 
a home territory is enhanced by the presence of family, and particularly of children; the right 
to privacy in the home is realised through association with „family life‟; home as identity has 
family connotations; and family is identified as the most significant socio-cultural facet of 
home.  These references to the importance of family in relation to the meaning of home, by 
the occupiers of homes, support the legislative and judicial policy leanings towards protecting 
family homes, over and above homes in general.  Despite this, there is no evidence to suggest 
that these policies have been based on any explicit and systematic examination of the 
meaning of home to occupiers.
166
 
 
The idea of adding value to home on the basis that it is a family home would appear to be 
both attractive to policymakers, and supportable on the basis of the research discussed in this 
article.  A legal concept of home that focuses on the family home could, however, create 
practical difficulties.  If the concept of home is focused around the status of family home, it 
will require a definition of a qualifying „family unit‟.  This could raise a number of further 
policy issues in relation to non-traditional family arrangements.  The difficulties surrounding 
the formulation of such a definition have been well documented in recent literature 
concerning the „functional family‟.167  Potential areas of difficulty might include the 
acceptability of discrimination on the basis of marital status or sexual orientation.
168
  Another 
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question which would inevitably flow from a concept of home that prioritises family would 
be whether a single person would be, or ought to be regarded as capable of establishing a 
home.
169
  These issues would have to be addressed in any explicit conceptualisation of home 
as family home.     
 
Overarching all of this, and arguably hindering the development of a legal concept of home, 
is the argument that the concept of home is not „real‟, but rather: “…that there is a complex 
ideology of home which includes our expectations and desires…that home is both an imposed 
ideal and a potent cultural and individual ideal.”170  This does not, however, diminish the 
argument in support of a concept of home. Although epigrams such as „home is where the 
heart is‟ and „there‟s no place like home‟ portray attachment to home as sentimental, these 
expressions, and the responses they describe, are informed by important cultural, social and 
psychological attachments.
171
  One of the difficulties, however, from a legal perspective, is 
the inherent intangibility of these responses towards home.  Dovey‟s observation that: “[t]he 
rational attitude is biased towards the tangible.  Yet the phenomenon of home…is an 
intangible relationship between people and the places in which they dwell; it is not visible nor 
accurately measurable.”;172 goes some way to explain why the rationally underpinned legal 
system has tended to prefer the interests of creditors in the economic value of the house to the 
non-economic interests of occupiers in their home.  Although an occupier‟s interest in 
property as a home is intangible, that is certainly not an insurmountable hurdle to the 
recognition of legally defensible rights.  It would, however, be necessary for policymakers to 
embark on a process of disentangling the real from the ideal, and to explicitly consider 
whether an occupier‟s intangible attachment to home ought to add weight to their claims 
when seeking to defend proceedings brought by creditors.   
 
The purpose of this article has been to advance an argument in support of the development of 
a legal concept of home.  Happily, lawyers would not have to start this process „from 
scratch‟.  The rich body of knowledge and research literature which has been developed in 
other disciplines, and which has matured from the „speculative‟173 to increasingly 
sophisticated and scientific studies, is primed to inform the process of developing a legal 
concept of home.  Though the formulation of a coherent concept of home would by no means 
be an easy challenge, it is a challenge that ought to be met.  Amongst other uses, the 
development of such a concept would assist policymakers when called upon to attach 
appropriate weight to the values of home, and therefore to truly balance the interests of 
occupiers in the home against those of creditors.          
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